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Depressive Deficits in Memory: Focusing Attention Improves 
Subsequent Recall 
Paula T. Hertel 
Trinity University 
Stephanie S. Rude 
University of Texas at Austin 
Ss diagnosed as depressed, recovered from depression, or without a history of depression 
perform� an unintentional learning task, followed by tests of free and forced recall. In the 
learning task, Ss decided whether a series of nouns sensibly completed corresponding sentence 
frames that varied in decision difficulty. For half of the Ss, the focus of attention was uncon­
strained by the demands of this task. The others, however, were required to repeat the targeted 
noun at the end of the trial as a. means of focusing their attention on the task. Depressed Ss in 
the unfocused condition subsequently recalled fewer words than did both control groups, but 
this deficit disappeared in the focused condition. These results suggest that depression might not 
fundamentally impair the resources required for good performance on such tasks. The results' 
relevance to resource-allocation, initiative, and inhibition accounts of depressive deficits in 
memory is discussed. 
A depressed mood is often accompanied by perceived and 
actual difficulties in remembering past events. This observa­
tion has received empirical support within the clinical and 
experimental literatures (see reviews by Ellis & Ashbrook, 
1988; Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1988). The 
most widely held interpretation of depressive deficits in mem­
ory is that depression imposes a limitation on the cognitive 
resources that are available for performing beneficial memory 
procedures. This "resource" account of depressive deficits 
originated from a d istinction between automatic and effortful 
processes (Hasher & Zacks, 1979) and was further developed 
by Ellis and Ashbrook's (1988) emphasis on resource alloca­
tion. In both developments, the theoretical footing was sup­
plied by Kahneman's (1973) assumption of a fixed capacity 
or pool of cognitive resources available for conscious atten­
tion. 
The resource account assumes either that depression re­
duces capacity physiologically or that it occupies a portion of 
the available resources through the allocation of attention to 
task-irrelevant matters; fewer resources are therefore available 
for performing procedures that will benefit later attempts to 
remember. This formulation was derived from work with 
college students who were either naturally dysphoric or ex­
perimentally "depressed" by mood-induction procedures, but 
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it has received some support from studies conducted with 
clinically depressed patients (see Wil iams et al., 1988). 
In this report, we provide evidence of greater flexibility in 
depressed subjects' allocation of resources than what has been 
implied by the resource account. Most tasks used in demon­
strations of depressive deficits allow variation in the perform­
ance of specific procedures. These tasks are not designed to 
prevent diversions by guiding all subjects through procedures 
that will be ultimately beneficial. For example, when subjects 
are asked to study a list of inherently organized words (as in 
Weingartner, Cohen, Murphy, Martello, & Gerdt, 1981), 
some subjects might merely notice that the words are orga­
nized, whereas others will develop elaborate retrieval schemes 
that are based on the organization. When depressed subjects 
do only the former, we cannot assume that they are incapable 
of doing the latter. Indeed, depressed subjects might be quite 
capable of performing procedures that are well specified, 
regardless of the attentional demands involved. Their failure 
to do so spontaneously in unstructured situations might im­
plicate difficulties in planning and initiation (Hertel & Hardin, 
1990) or difficulties in inhibiting attention to sources of 
distraction (Hasher & Zacks, 1988) and degenerated inten­
tions (Kuhl & Helle, 1986), but not necessarily limitations on 
their capacity for effortful thought. 
In research with dysphoric and experimentally depressed 
college students, Hertel and Hardin ( 1990) found depressive 
deficits in the spontaneous use of strategies during recognition 
testing, that is, deficits that were reduced or eliminated when 
such strategies were provided. Leight and Ellis (1981) dem­
onstrated, through experimental inductions, depressive defi­
cits in the detection of strategies for learning, but not in the 
use of such strategies when they had been detected in a 
previously neutral state. Similarly, providing clinically de­
pressed subjects with strategies for problem solving is an 
effective way to reduce the usual impairment (Abramson, 
Alloy, & Rosoff, 1981; Silberman, Weingartner, & Post, 
1983). These investigations of strategic processing suggest that 
depressed subjects are capable of effortful thought, but the 
relative attentional demands in the inception and use of such 
strategies remain unknown. 
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The research reported here illustrates a more basic ap­
proach. In designing this experiment, we hoped to show that 
depressed people are capable of performing effortful proce­
dures when the task requires them to focus attention. Partic­
ipants in the experiment included clinically depressed outpa­
tients, outpatients recovered from depression, and a com­
munity sample of adults with no history of psychological 
disturbance. Our experimental method was similar to the one 
used in Experiment 3 by Ellis, Thomas, and Rodriguez ( 1984 ); 
it was chosen because that study is frequently cited in support 
of the resource account. 
Ellis et al. (1984) induced depressed or neutral moods in 
college students before presenting them with an incidental 
learning task. The task required subjects to make decisions 
about the semantic fit of words into sentence frames. These 
frames were more or less difficult to complete with the tar­
geted words, according to independent ratings. An unexpected 
test of free recall of targets followed the learning phase. The 
results from this test and others using similar procedures 
(Hertel, 1989; Hertel & Rude, 1991; Tyler, Hertel, McCallum, 
& Ellis, 1979) showed that subjects in a neutral mood recalled 
more words from the difficult sentences than from the easy 
sentences. However, Ellis et al.'s depressed subjects recalled 
similar numbers of words from easy and difficult sentences 
and thereby demonstrated impaired memory for materials 
from difficult contexts. 
Our method included a similar learning phase, but we 
varied the extent to which attention to the targeted words was 
required during that phase. In the focused condition, the 
target appeared only briefly at the beginning of the trial and 
was followed by the sentence; with the offset of the sentence, 
subjects repeated the word aloud and reported their judgment 
of fit (yes or no). In the unfocused condition, the target 
remained on the screen; subjects were allowed to report their 
decision at any point during the trial and were not asked to 
report the target. (The unfocused condition was closer to the 
method used by Ellis et al., 1984, who presented sentence 
frames and noun pairs successively and allowed subjects to 
choose the correct alternative by pressing a button at any 
point during the presentation of the pair.) Subjects in the 
unfocused condition could engage in further processing after 
the decision was made or could allow their minds to wander. 
We predicted that depressed subjects would be less likely 
than nondepressed subjects to maintain their attention to the 
task when not explicitly required to do so (i.e., in the unfo­
cused condition). The rationale for this prediction rests on 
the well-documented tendency for depressed people to show 
chronic levels of self-focused attention or otherwise to focus 
on task-irrelevant matters (see Ingram, 1990). As Hasher and 
Zacks (1988) proposed for elderly samples, irrelevant focus 
disrupts task-appropriate processing and enhances competi­
tion during retrieval. The consequence would be a depressive 
deficit in recall following the unfocused learning task. In 
contrast, all subjects in the focused condition were kept on 
task by the requirement to repeat the word and the decision 
at the end of the trial. We therefore predicted comparable 
levels of recall from the non depressed and depressed subjects 
in the focused condition, all of whom should be capable of 
allocating sufficient resources to comply with task demands. 
The method used in this research also included a secondary­
task technique for assessing the availability of attentional 
resources. Subjects pressed a key in response to a brief tone 
that occurred during their exposure to the sentence frame. 
Longer latencies to respond to the tone are offered as indica­
tions that fewer resources are available for tone detection, 
typically because they are allocated in greater proportion to 
the primary task (see Inhoff & Aeming, 1989; Kerr, 1973; 
Tyler et al., 1979). 1 Longer response latencies by depressed 
subjects might also reflect motor retardation or the allocation 
of attention to task-irrelevant matters. In an exploratory 
attempt to address these issues, we included two series of 
baseline trials in which tones were presented apart from the 
primary task. The baseline trials were used to evaluate preex­
isting differences in response latencies (as might be incurred 
by task-irrelevant thinking or by motor retardation on the 
part of depressed subjects). These differences were partialed 
out in subsequent analyses of secondary-task performance. 
The adjusted latencies were then used to examine depression­
related differences in the allocation of attention to the learning 
task. 
In summary, participants were currently depressed, re­
covered from depression, or reporting no history of depres­
sion. Regardless of their diagnostic status, they were assigned 
to an incidental learning task that varied in the extent to 
which it constrained the focus of attention and that was 
followed by an unexpected test of recall. We predicted that 
depressed subjects would show impaired recall compared with 
nondepressed controls, but only under unfocused learning 
conditions, when subjects' attention could be diverted to task­
irrelevant matters. By requiring more attention to the task, 
the focused condition was expected to eliminate differences 
associated with a depressed state. Finally, a secondary task 
was used to investigate possible differences in the allocation 
of attentional resources. 
Method 
Subjects 
Criteria. Our criteria for participation included (a) an upper limit 
of 55 years of age; (b) a high-school diploma or its equivalent; (c) 
fluency in English; (d) no prior history of shock treatment, organic 
1 Conceptual problems arise from secondary task-methods for as­
sessing use of fiXed capacity (see Hasher & Zacks, 1988). These 
problems, however, are inherent in the assumption of a unified pool 
of resources and the concomitant need to assess the resource demands 
of a particular task, independent from memory performance. The 
secondary-task technique is probably the best one available for those 
purposes and has produced consistent results across experiments 
performed with the methods we use in this report (see Hertel, 1989; 
Hertel & Rude, 1991; Tyler et al., 1979). 
Somewhat different issues regarding secondary tasks were raised 
by Williams et al. (1988). They reviewed evidence suggesting that the 
use of a secondary task may reduce the frequency of distracting 
thoughts in depression (which would reduce deficits in subsequent 
recall). This issue would arise in the context of the present research, 
if a deficit were not observed; the use of the secondary task was a 
constant factor with respect to the conditions of our primary task. 
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impairment, seizures, or thought disorder; and (e) no recent history 
of substance abuse. Subjects recruited for the depressed and recovered 
groups must have had diagnoses of depression with no evidence of 
manic episodes. Subjects recruited for the nonpsychiatri�ntrol 
group must have had no prior history of psychological disturbance. 
Recruiting methods. Potential participants were contacted 
through several sources. The primary source for depressed and re­
covered outpatients was the Audie L. Murphy Veterans Administra­
tion (VA) Hospital in San Antonio, Texas. Psychiatrists and a psy­
chologist on the staff wrote letters to psychiatric outpatients who 
conformed to our criteria (which were later verified by checking the 
records). Non psychiatric controls were obtained through other med­
ical clinics. Another major source was a private clinic that routinely 
tests applicants for the Texas Rehabilitation Commission. Suitable 
clients were contacted by mail by the psychologists on its staff. 
All letters offered the opportunity to participate in a research study 
at Trinity University. Prospective participants were told that the study 
involved the use of a computer to perform routine cognitive tasks. 
The letter promised payment of$1 0 per hour and provided the names 
and phone numbers of individuals to contact. When volunteers 
phoned, they we.re screened for uncorrected or poorly corrected 
vision. 
The third source of participants was the staff of Trinity University, 
which was added midway through the study for the purpose of 
recruiting nonpsychiatric controls. We circulated fliers that described 
the study, payment, method of volunteering, and certain criteria (age, 
language, and educational level). 
Final sample. A total of 86 individuals volunteered. Ten volun­
teers did not show up for their appointments (others did not show up 
for initial appointments, but were rescheduled successfully). For their 
data to remain in the sample, depressed subjects were required to 
meet Research Diagnostic Criteria (ROC) for major or minor depres­
sion (Spitzer, Endicott, & Robins, 1978), with no report of monic 
episodes. These criteria were applied to responses collected during a 
structured clinical interview (see the procedures). On the basis of this 
interview, participants with prior diagnoses of depression were clas­
sified as recovered from depression if they did not meet the ROC and 
if they scored less than 14 on the Beck Depression Inventory (BDl; 
Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961). Taylor and KJein 
( 1989) recommended that a cutoff score of 14 on the BDI shou.ld be 
used as an index of recovery. The same criteria regarding the interview 
and BDI were also used to validate the nondepressed status of 
nonpsychiatric controls. 
Data were set aside for 12 subjects who did not meet our initial 
criteria (4 subjects showed evidence of manic episodes revealed during 
our clinical interview, another 3 subjects described current experience 
of substance abuse, 2 subjects had received shock treatments, 2 
subjects did not meet educational criteria, and I was too old). Data 
were set aside for another 4 subjects whose BDI scores fell outside 
the preestablished range. Finally, the data from 2 randomly selected 
subjects were eliminated from analyses to equalize numbers across 
task conditions. The distribution of the 58 remaining subjects, ac­
cording to diagnostic group, is described in Table 1, along with the 
demographic characteristics of the sample. (Age and the number of 
years of education did not reliably vary according to diagnostic status 
or the type of learning task.) Of the 58 subjects, 23 were recruited 
from the VA, I I from private practice, and 14 from the staff at 
Trinity University. 
Experimental Materials 
Learning task. The learning task conformed to the methods of 
Tyler et al. ( 1979, Experiment 4), but was computer-implemented. It 
consisted of 40 sentence-completion trials. Each trial required the 
Table l 
Characteristics of the Sample 
Diagnostic status 
Measure Non psychiatric Recovered Depressed 
Total n 16 16 26 
Age 38.9 41.1 40.7 
Education 13.9 14.9 13.8 
Gender 
Female 9 6 6 
Male 7 10 20 
Ethnicity 
Anglo 10 II 17 
Asian 0 1 0 
Black 2 2 I 
Hispanic 4 2 8 
Hospitalization 
None 16 II 15 
<I year 0 0 4 
>I year 0 5 7 
Note. Most entries are the numbers of participants in each category; 
age and education are noted in mean numbers of years. Hospitaliza­
tion refers to the interval between participation and hospitalization 
for psychiatric purposes. 
subject to view a word followed by a sentence with one word missing 
and to decide whether the word fit sensibly into that sentence frame. 
Unknown to the subject at the outset, all words fit sensibly into the 
corresponding frames. The 40 words were nouns high in frequency, 
concreteness, and meaningfulness; their accompanying sentence 
frames had been pretested for difficulty of completion (see Hertel, 
1989). Each word appeared with easy frames for approximately half 
of the subjects in each experimental conditions and with difficult 
frames for the others. For example, the word artist was sometimes 
followed by The young man's portrait was painted by the __ . Other 
subjects saw artist followed by The young mans physique was ad­
mired by the -- . 
The learning task was implemented on a CompuAdd-286 com­
puter. The program began with the presentation of instructions, 15 
baseline trials of tone detection, and 4 practice trials that represented 
each level of difficulty and tone delay. AU practice and lea.ming trials 
began with a l·s display of a word at the top center of the screen. In 
the focused condition, the offset of the word occurred simultaneously 
with the onset of the sentence frame, which was centered on the 
screen and remained exposed for 8 s. In the unfocused condition, the 
word remained exposed for the duration of the sentence frame. On 
80% of the trials in both conditions, a weak but detectable tone 
occurred at delays of I, 2, 4, or 6 s after the onset of the frame. With 
the offset of the frame, a question mark appeared and the trial was 
terminated by a keypress. A blank screen lasting I s separated trials. 
The 40 words were grouped into blocks of I 0. Each block contained 
4 five-letter words, 4 six-letter words, I seven-letter word, and 1 eight­
letter word. Across subjects, words were maintained in these blocks 
as they rotated through the 10 counterbalanced orders obtained by 
crossing sentence difficulty (easy vs. difficult) with tone delay (no 
tone or a delay of I, 2, 4, or 6 s after the onset of the sentence). The 
order of tone delays was consta.nt for aU subjects. 
Procedure and Other Materials 
The experimental session began with informed consent, followed 
by an initial administration of the Multiple Affect Adjective Check 
List (MAACL Today Form, Zuckerman & Lubin, 1965). The exper­
imenter assigned subjects to conditions for the learning task on the 
basis of their previous diagnosis. Assignment to the focused or unfo-
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cused condition was random, with the constraint of obtaining equal 
numbers in each type of task within each diagnostic group. As 
described above, crossing the two levels of sentence difficulty with 
the five levels of tone onset for counterbalancing purposes produced 
10 stimulus-presentation orders to which subjects could be assigned. 
The 13 depressed subjects in each learning condition were distributed 
across these 10 orders such thai all orders were represented. Because 
there were only 8 recovered and 8 control subjects in each learning 
condition, all 10 orders could not be used in these groups. But 
sentence difficulty was balanced, and the 8 subjects in each group 
received unique orders with one exception: In one group only 7 of 
the I 0 possible orders were used. 
Instructions and examples for the learning task were presented 
orally and on the computer screen; they were augmented by further 
clarification by the experimenter when it was necessary. Subjects were 
informed that two different tasks would be performed simultaneously: 
a primary sentence-<:ompletion task and a secondary task of detecting 
an auditory signal. For the primary task, subjects were instructed to 
decide whether the word presented at the top of the screen fit sensibly 
into the incomplete sentence presented below it. If they were assigned 
to the foc.used condition, they were told to repeat the word and the 
decision (by saying "yes" or "no") when the question mark appeared 
at the end of the trial and then to press a key when they were ready 
for the next trial. Subjects in the unfocused condition were asked to 
report their decision whenever they chose to do so; the question mark 
signaled them to press a key when they were ready for the next trial. 
All subjects were informed that most trials would require a "yes" 
response, but that some subjects would experience a few negative 
instances; therefore, they should consider all decisions carefully. 
Instructions for the secondary task told subjects to respond to the 
tone by pressing a key with a finger on their nondominant hand. 
Fifteen baseline trials for tone detection were presented first a.nd 
followed by a review of the requirements for the upcoming primary 
task. This preview emphasized pressing as quickly as possible in 
response to the tone, but without sacrificing attention to the primary 
task. The experimente.r answered any questions before resuming the 
program. The four practice trials preoeding the learning trials pro­
vided additional opportunities for clarification. 
After the learning task and a final set of 15 baseline trials, subjects 
solved arithmetic problems for 2 min (to prevent recency effects in 
free recall). Then the experimenter asked the subjects to write down 
all the words they could remember from the words appearing at the 
top of the screen during the learning phase; 2 min were allotted for 
free recall. Then the experimenter asked them to try harder to recall 
and to write at least 20 words, guessing if necessary. So that we could 
later differentiate between free and forced recall, a line was drawn 
beneath the last word of their initial attempt. (For discussions of the 
forcing procedure, see Erdelyi, Finks, & Feigin-Pfau, 1989; Roediger, 
Srinivas, & Waddill, 1989.) 
Next, subjects filled out another MAACL and the BDl. The 
experimenter orally administered Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale­
RevisC:d (W AIS-R) Vocabulary subscale. Then she conducted an 
interview that provided information about age, educational level, 
history of psychological treatment, and prescribed and non prescribed 
drugs currently or recently used by the subject. The interview pro­
gressed through a series of questions that allowed us to use ROC for 
determining specific diagnoses of depression and anxiety. (ROC 
guidelines are straightforward; the experimenter's notes on responses 
were independently scored by two judges who agreed completely.) 
Results and Discussion 
Recall 
The mean number of total words recalled (free and forced) 
are shown in the top half of Table 2. What is readily apparent 
Table 2 
Mean Number of Words Recalled 
Diagnostic status 
Learning task Non psychiatric Recovered Depressed 
Total recall 
Unfocused 
Easy frames 2.88 4.12 1.46 
Difficult frames 4.62 5.00 3.08 
Both 7.50 9.12 4.54 
Focused 
Easy frames 3.50 4.62 3.77 
Difficult frames 4.25 4.62 5.38 
Both 7.75 9.25 9.15 
Free recall 
Unfocused 
Easy frames 1.88 2.75 0.77 
Difficult frames 3.62 3.25 1.46 
Both 5.50 6.00 2.23 
Focused 
Easy frames 1.88 3.00 2.54 
Difficult frames 3.00 2.88 4.00 
Both 4.88 5.88 6.54 
Note. n = 8 for non psychiatric, 8 for recovered, and 13 for depressed. 
(and also reliable) is that a depressive deficit was obtained in 
the unfocused learning condition, but that depressed subjects 
recalled as well as controls in the focused condition. 
A mixed-design analysis of variance, with between-subjects 
factors for diagnostic group (nonpsychiatric, recovered, and 
depressed) and learning task (unfocused vs. focused) and 
within-subjects factors for sentence frame (easy vs. difficult) 
and type of recall (free vs. forced), revealed several reliable 
effects. For all effects examined here and throughout this 
report, a was set at .OS. Reliable effects that involved diag­
nostic status were further examined through orthogonal com­
parisons: (a) depressed versus both control groups and (b) 
non psychiatric versus recovered controls. These planned com­
parisons were used for all dependent variables, so that uniform 
issues could be addressed. 
First, subjects in the unfocused condition recalled fewer 
words than did those in the focused condition, F(l, 52) = 
4.14, MSe = 2.30. This disadvantage, however, reliably de­
pended on diagnostic status, .f\2, 52) = 3.82. Depressed 
subjects derived a greater benefit from the focused task than 
did the control groups (who did not differ reliably in this 
regard), .f\1, 52)= 7.64. 
Second, subjects recalled more words that had been evalu­
ated in the difficult sentence frames, compared with the easy 
ones, F(l, 52)= 8.38, MSe = 1.99. The difficulty of the frame, 
however, did not reliably interact with diagnostic status or the 
type of learning task. 
The third set of reliable effects involved the type of recall 
test. We obtained a reliable three-way interaction of the type 
of test, the diagnostic status, and the type of learning task, 
F(2, 52)= 5.19, MS. = 2.17. This interaction was understood 
by examining recall within each type of testing condition. 
Essentially, the interaction of diagnostic status with the type 
of learning task described above occurred for free recall, but 
not for forced recall. 
DEPRESSIVE DEFICITS IN MEMORY 305 
Free-recall means are presented in the bottom half of Table 
2; the difference between the depressed group and the controls 
reliably depended on the type of learning task, F(l, 52) = 
15.41, MS. = 2.55. Depressed subjects freely recalled fewer 
words than controls following the unfocused task (Ms = 2.23 
for depressed and 5.75 for controls), but slightly more words 
following the focused task (Ms = 6.54 for depressed and 5.38 
for controls). In contrast, no reliable differences were found 
among means for forced recall (obtainable by subtracting 
means in the bottom half of Table 2 from means in the top 
halt). 
Among others, Johnson and Magaro (1987) suggested that 
depressive deficits in recall result in part from a conservative 
bias in depressive styles of responding. Such a bias should be 
revealed by the forced-recall procedure in the present experi­
ment, in that depressed subjects should recall more words 
than nondepressed subjects when forced to guess. Depressed 
subjects recalled 2.46 additional words, on average, whereas 
the mean for all controls was 2.84. Our results therefore did 
not provide evidence that deficits in free recall are confounded 
by response bias. 
Finally, the effect of the frame's difficulty depended on the 
type of test, F(l, 52)= 4.29, MS.= 1.57. Again, no reliable 
effects were found for forced recall, but the effect of difficulty 
on free recall reliably obtained, F(l, 52)= 12.40, MS.= 1.80. 
Recall and severity of depression. Johnson and Magaro 
( 1987) , in a review of memory and clinical depression, con­
cluded that severity of depression is an important factor. 
When the total number of words recalled by all subjects in 
this study were entered into correlation with their BDI scores, 
a reliable but low association was found, r(56) = -.36. The 
correlation was not reliable in the focused condition, r(27) = 
-.23. It was reliable in the unfocused condition, r(27) = -.56, 
but not reliably higher than the correlation in the focused 
task. However, when free recall was correlated with BDI 
scores, a reliable difference obtained (r = -.10 in the focused 
condition and -.67 in the unfocused condition; z = 2.171). 
Severity of depression, then, appears to be moderately corre­
lated with recall under conditions in which attentional con­
straints are minimized. 
Recall according to the response on the learning 
task. During the Learning task, subjects made a mean num­
ber of 2.07 negative responses to difficult sentence frames and 
subsequently recalled a mean number of 0.60 words judged 
not to fit in those frames. These negative responses and 
subsequently recalled words were evenly distributed across 
conditions and no reliable differences were revealed. As might 
be expected, negative responses to easy frames were negligible 
in number (M = .17), and so were the numbers of words 
recalled from those trials (M = .05). 
Latencies in Responding to the Tone 
Baseline trials. Means of median latencies from each set 
of baseline trials are shown in the top half of Table 3. A 
mixed-design analysis of variance with factors for diagnostic 
status, type of learning task, and time of administration 
(before or after the learning task) revealed a reliable main 
Table 3 
Means of Median Latencies in Milliseconds 
Diagnostic status 
Condition Non psychiatric Recovered Depressed 
Baseline trials 
Before learning task 
Unfocused task 305 333 820 
Focused task 481 670 466 
After learning task 
Unfocused task 296 294 584 
Focused task 335 387 443 
Secondary task (adjusted by baseline medians) 
Unfocused task 
Easy frames 610 810 876 
Difficult frames 785 971 1380 
Focused task 
Easy frames 755 776 1076 
Difficult frames 993 937 1304 
Note. n = 8 for non psychiatric, 8 for recovered, and 13 for depressed. 
effect of timing, � l ,  52) = 15.52, MS. = 26696.10. Subjects 
responded more quickly after the learning task. 
The analysis also revealed a reliable three-way interaction, 
F(2, 52) = 5.68, which was understood by examining median 
latencies on each set of baseline trials. On the set of baseline 
trials that occurred before the learning task, diagnostic status 
reliably interacted with the type of task, even though it bad 
not yet occurred, F(2, 52) = 3.77, MS. � 184385.99. More 
specifically, longer latencies by depressed subjects occurred 
only for those who later received the unfocused task, F(l, 52) 
= 7.07. After the learning task, the only reliable effect pointed 
to longer latencies by depressed subjects overall, F(l, 52) = 
5. 73, MS. = 86238.06. The interaction in the pretask trials is 
difficult to interpret. For example, the data collected on 
severity of depression (e.g., BDI scores and distributions across 
ROC categories described below) do not indicate that the 
subjects in the unfocused learning condition were more de­
pressed. Regardless, the posttask effect suggested that both 
depressed groups were affected by task-irrelevant factors that 
operated throughout the learning task and beyond. 
Secondary task. Median latencies on the secondary task 
were reliably correlated with median baseline latencies, r = 
.66, �1, 51)= 38.93, MS.= 533956.60. They were conse­
quently adjusted by the baseline medians, averaged across the 
two sets. The adjusted means are shown in the bottom half 
of Table 3. An analysis of covariance revealed only a margin­
ally reliable main effect of diagnostic status, F(2, 51) = 2. 79, 
p < .08. But because differences in the availability of cognitive 
resources are central to resource accounts of depressive defi­
cits, we examined comparisons among diagnostic groups. 
Only the comparison between the depressed subjects and the 
controls was reliable, �1, 52) = 5.40; depressed subjects 
responded more slowly to the tone, even when baseline dif­
ferences were controlled. 
The type of learning task did not reliably affect latencies 
(with or without the covariate). The only reliable effect in the 
overall analysis occurred with respect to the difficulty of the 
sentence frame, F{l, 52)= 10.02, MS.= 148816.95. As is 
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typically found, subjects took longer to respond to the tone 
on the more difficult trials. 2 
Diagnostic Indices 
WAIS-R Vocabulary subsea/e. Scores on this test were 
submitted to an analysis of variance, with factors for diagnos­
tic group and type of learning task. Means are presented in 
Table 4. Although there was an apparent trend for subjects in 
the focused condition to score higher, there were no reliable 
differences. Scores on the W AIS-R were not reliably. corre­
lated with recall performance, r(56) = .03. The correlation 
between recall and years of education was not reliable as well, 
r(56) = .04. 
BDl. Kendall, Hollon, Beck, Hammen, and lng{am 
(1987) recommended reserving the label depression for Sub 
jects who score 16 and above on the BDI and who also meet 
criteria for depression ascertained through a structured clinical 
interview. Two subjects whom we categorized as depressed 
produced BDI scores of 14 or 15, but these subjects tnet ROC 
for definite major depression. Consequently, we included their 
data in the depressed conditions. Recovered subjects all scored 
below 14 on the BDl. Mean scores on the BDI are presented 
in Table 4; they were submitted to two separate analyses of 
variance: one for scores obtained from recovered and control 
subjects in both conditions of the learning task and the other 
for scores obtained from the two groups of depreSsed subjects. 
(Analyses were separated because we hac.l established cutoff 
scores on the BDl.) These analyses revealed no reliable differ­
ences. 
RDC. Of the 13 depressed subjects in the unfocused con­
dition, lO met criteria for definite major depression, 1 met 
Table 4 
Means on Diagnostic Measures Collected in Session 
· · .Diagnostic status 
f 
M�ure Nonpsychiatric Recovered Depressed 
WAI5-R Vocabulary 
QpfoCused task 10.4 10.6 9.8 
·n 8 8 13 
Focused task 11.4 10.1 11.8 
n 8 8 13 
BDI 
Unfocused task 5.6 4.6 25.1 
n 8 8 13 
Focused task 6.5 4.5 26.2 
n 8 8 13 
MAACL-Depression 
Pre -6.4 -9.7 1.5 
n 16 16 26 
Post -2.2 -9.1 0.1 
n 16 16 26 
MAACL-Anxiety 
Pre -3.7 -4.8 1.2 
n 16 16 26 
Post -0.6 -4.9 0.5 
n 16 16 26 
Note. Subscales on the Multiple Affect Adjective Check List 
(MAACL) were computed by subtracting the negative score from the 
positive score in each affective category. WAIS-R refers to the Wechs­
ler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised. BDI refers to the Beck Depres­
sion Inventory. 
criteria for probable major depression, and 2 met criteria for 
minor depression. Of the 13 subjects in the focused condition, 
12 met criteria for definite major depression and 1 met criteria 
for probable major depression. Eight of the depressed subjects 
in each learning condition also met criteria for anxiety. 
MAACL. To produce approximately normal distributions 
of scores on the MAACL, the positive and negative dimen­
sions of the scales for depression and for anxiety were col­
lapsed by subtracting the negative score from the positive 
seore. The resulting scores for depression and anxiety were 
submitted to separate analysis of variance, with factors for 
diagnostic status and type. of leaming task and repeated meas­
ures on the time of �tdministration (before the learning task 
or after recall). Means are shown in Table 4. Lower scores 
indicate lower levels of the mood in question. 
Neither analysis �owed reliable effects involving the type 
of learning task. The analysis of depression scores revealed a 
reliable main effect of diagnostic status, F(2, 52) = 17.85, 
MS.= 58.59. Planned comparisons showed that the depressed 
group scored higher than the control groups, F(l , 52)= 28.53, 
and that nonpsychiatric controls scored higher than recovered 
subjects, .F(l, 52) = 7.17. In addition, the interaction of 
<lfagnostic group with time of administration was reliable, 
F(2, 52) • 5.22, MS.= 14.54. The depressed subjects main­
tained their initial moods to a greater degree than did control 
subjects, F(l , 52)= 6.83. And there was a trend for the moods 
of nonpsychiatric controls to worsen more than the moods of 
recovered control .F(l, 52)= 3.62, p < .07. 
The analysis of anxiety scores revealed similar effects. The 
main effect diagnostic status, F(2, 52) = 14.47, M!:>'c = 
22.66, was partitioned into the same two comparisons: � 
pressed subjects were more anxious than controls, .F(l, 52)= 
23.95, and rwnpsychiatric controls were more anxious than 
recovered controls, F( l, 52)= 4.98. Diagnostic status reliably 
interacted with the time of administration, F(2, 52) = 6.68, 
MS. = 5.46. Depressed subjects tended to maintain their 
initially anxious moods more than controls tended to stay 
relatively less anxious, F(l, 52)= 5.92. The anxiety levels of 
nonpsychiatric controls increased more than those of re­
covered controls, F(1, 52)= 7.44. 9 
Medication. One subject among the 16 nonpsychiatric 
controls reported taking an antidepressant, prescribed for 
reasons other than depression. In the group of 16 recovered 
controls, 31% were currently medicated with antidepressants 
and 25% with antianxiety drugs. Among the 26 currently 
depressed subjects, 35% reported current use of antidep es­
sants and 35% antianxiety medications. About half of the 
subjects in each diagnostic group reported use of other pre­
scribed medications. All subjects reported only slight to mod­
erate use (if any) of alcohol and infrequent use (if any) of 
other recreational drugs. 
2 We acknowledge an interest in median latencies distributed across 
categories of tone delay; depressed subjects might show patterns that 
differ from nondepressed subjects. However, the 16 tone-present trials 
.'til.· each condition of difficulty, the four delays, and moderately 
Varntble raw latencies make meaningful analysis difficult. 
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Presence Versus Absence of Symptoms of Anxiety 
Anxiety is a common presenting symptom in clinical inter­
views with depressed clients, and differential diagnosis is quite 
difficult (Greenberg & Beck, 1989). Most of our depressed 
subjects met ROC for anxiety as well as for depression. Yet, 
there are potentially important differences in the cognitive 
correlates of these disorders (Williams et al., 1988). We there­
fore performed additional analyses on the data from depressed 
subjects by using between-subjects factors for anxiety (pres­
ence or absence) and the type of learning task. There were 5 
subjects without anxious symptoms in each condition of the 
learning task (and 8 anxious subjects). Age, ethnicity, educa­
tional background, and W AIS-R scores were comparable for 
anxious and nonanxious subjects, although the latter pro­
duced slightly higher scores on the BDI (29.50 vs. 23.25). 
Latencies and recall scores did not reliably differ according to 
the presence of anxious symptoms, but trends showed that 
nonanxious depressed subjects in the unfocused task took 
longer to respond to the tones and subsequently recalled 
slightly fewer words (the means were 4.00 for nonanxious and 
4.88 for anxious subjects). In the focused condition, the means 
on recall and latencies showed no apparent trends. 
General Discussion 
When the nature of the learning task allowed greater vari­
ation in the focus of attention, depressive deficits occurred in 
subsequent recall; when the focus of attention was constrained 
by the nature of the learning task, these deficits were elimi­
nated. These were the major findings demonstrated in this 
report. 
The task used to demonstrate the effects of attentional 
control was chosen because it is representative of learning 
tasks in which depressive deficits have been observed. It is 
very similar to one of the tasks used by Ellis et al. (1984) in 
their examination of the relationship between depressive def­
icits and attentional resources. Although this report might be 
the first documentation of effective attentional control during 
the learning phase of an experiment on depressive memory, 
other investigations provide some basis for suggesting that 
depressive deficits can be more generally eliminated through 
the experimental control or constraint of cognitive processing. 
By controlling the use of strategies during retrieval, for ex­
ample, Hertel and Hardin ( 1990) improved the recognition 
performance of depressed students. And in their review of 
findings from a variety of experimental paradigms, Hertel 
and Hardin suggested that depressive deficits typically occur 
when tasks permit variation in specific cognitive procedureS. 
Nondepressed subjects are likely to detect or invent appropri­
ate procedures spontaneously, but depressed subjects tend to 
do only what they are told to do. 
In our experiment, opportunity for the spontaneous use of 
procedures was provided in the unfocused condition, in which 
subjects could choose to rehearse the materials and possibly 
provide elaborations and distinctions. In contrast, the focused 
condition required rehearsal of the target and delayed report 
of the decision, such that more elaborative and distinctive 
processing of the target in the context of the sentence frame 
was possibly encouraged. We are not interested in claiming 
that these specific processes occurred; rather, we suggest that 
these or other processes were more likely to be invoked by 
the . .focused learning task and more likely left to the subjects' 
initiative in the unfocused task. 
Our evidence for a depressive deficit in initiative is consist­
ent with the emphasis in the clinical literature on lack of self­
efficacy and feelings of failure (see Rehm, 1988), but the 
balance of cognitive and motivational factors that might 
contribute to the deficit is difficult to determine. The most 
general issue that arises in this context involves the distinction 
between factors related to competence and those related to 
performance. 
Performance-Competence Distinctions 
Do depressive deficits in memory tasks result from insuffi­
cient abilities, or are depressed people simply unmotivated to 
perform at the levels of competence that would otherwise 
reflect unimpaired ability? The issue of competence is further 
complicated by the question: Ability to do what? If the ability 
to focus attention when the task requires it is the issue, as in 
the present report, we know that depressed people can focus 
well enough to recall at "normal" levels. But if the issue is the 
ability to muster attention when it is not required, the answer 
is unknown. 
At first glance, it might seem that a motivational manipu­
lation would help. For example, if the unfocused learning task 
were performed under conditions of intentional learning, and 
if no impairment in subsequent recall resulted, we might 
conclude that the depressed subjects were sufficiently moti­
vated to exhibit their knowledge that it is important to pay 
attention to the words when they must later recall them. Even 
if such results obtained, however, we would need to account 
for the results from actual experiments on intentional learning 
that have shown depressive deficits (see Williams et al., 1988). 
In those cases, we do not know whether a lack of competence 
in discovering the best procedures was responsible, or whether 
the depressed subjects were not sufficiently motivated by the 
demands for recall to initiate their use. 
The picture is further clouded by an analysis of motiva­
tional factors in performance. Riskind (1989) suggested that 
one important factor in depressive deficits in memory is lack 
of interest, which might be supplied by increasing incentives. 
This approach would require an identification of suitable 
incentives for depressed people. Yet all motivational variables 
do not reduce to incentives and some seem to be meshed 
inextricably with cognitive variables. For example, Rehm 
( 1988) be lieved that depressed people easily access ideas re­
lated to failure and lack of self-efficacy as they perform 
cognitive tasks. Finally, certain types of "motivational" ma­
nipulations (e.g., intentional-learning instructions} might be 
better identified as cognitive variables. As we have implied, 
intentional-learning instructions might motivate subjects to 
perform well to preserve self-esteem. Alternatively, such in­
structions might operate simply as cues for learning proce­
dures. If the instructions to learn the words do not cue the 
appropriate procedures, the analysis reverts to issues related 
to competence. 
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In short, the conceptual distinction between competence 
and performance as it relates to the nature of depressive 
deficits in memory is a difficult distinction to make on 
empirical grounds. This difficulty probably arises in part from 
artificial boundaries between cognitive and motivational fac­
tors. Nevertheless, on practical grounds it is important to 
understand the conditions that do produce competent per­
formance by depressed people, so that tasks can be designed 
to tap these competencies (see Hertel, in press). This is the 
point that we want to emphasize, because our results speak 
directly to some aspects of competence. We next address those 
aspects in the context of two formulations of depressive 
deficits in memory: The resource-allocation account provided 
by Ellis and Ashbrook ( 1988) and an adaptation of Hasher 
and Zacks's ( 1988) model for cognitive difficulties associated 
with aging. 
Resource Allocation 
Despite the wide appeal of resource accounts of depressive 
memory impairments, they have not been fully developed. 
One neglected issue concerns the modifiability of resource 
limitations. In its strong form, the resource account makes a 
claim about the availability of resources by assuming that a 
certain proportion of attentional resources is made unavaila­
ble when a person is depressed. This form of the account is 
compatible with some biochemical approaches (see Wein­
gartner et al., 1981 ). The central prediction of Ellis and 
Ashbrook's ( 1988) resource-allocation model is that tasks that 
involve greater attentional demands will result in greater 
disparities in the performance of depressed and nondepressed 
subjects. In particular, demands imposed by more difficult 
tasks are more likely to exceed the depressed subjects' avail­
able resources. Ellis and Ashbrook did not explicitly address 
the issue of modifiability, although they did acknowledge the 
potential influence on memory performance of "a variety of 
task variables, subject variables, mood variables, instructional 
variables, and other contextual variables" (1988, pp. 30-31). 
As we view our results in relation to the resource account, 
we emphasize first that depressed subjects had sufficient re­
sources available for attending to the learning task: Recall 
following the focused task did not show a depressive deficit. 
This improvement cannot be attributed to reduced demands 
on resources, the explanatory variable emphasized by Ellis 
and Ashbrook (1988), because the task that eliminated the 
deficit was no less demanding than the task that produced it. 
It should also be noted that depression was stringently defined 
in our research and that severity of depression was reliably 
correlated with performance under the less-focused-learning 
and testing conditions, but not when attention was more 
controlled. Thus, the strong version of the resource account 
cannot incorporate our results. 
Nevertheless, the present findings do not demonstrate that 
depressed and nondepressed subjects have comparable 
amounts of resources available. Although the depressed sub­
jects in the focused condition recalled as well as controls, their 
latencies on the secondary task were longer. Perhaps they 
thought harder about the task materials than did controls 
(without a corresponding benefit for recall), or perhaps they 
were occupied with other matters, but we cannot rule out a 
basic limitation on the availability of resourceS as an expla­
nation of the longer latencies. Regardless, recall performance 
in the focused condition makes a case for competence in 
depression. From the point of view of resource theory, this 
means that sufficient resources were available to perform a 
task that Ellis et al. ( 1984) used to demonstrate that they were 
not available. 
A weaker form of the resource-allocation model might 
eschew the claim of reduced availability. Such an account 
would say that depressed people perform poorly on certain 
cognitive tasks because they allocate fewer resources to them. 
This is another way of saying that depressed people perform 
poorly when they do not pay attention to the factors that 
could benefit later recall (a potentially circular argument). In 
this case, there is no advantage in reasoning about resources, 
but perhaps a good advantage in asking why depressed people 
do not spontaneously attend to task-relevant factors. This is 
the question addressed next. 
Difficulties in Inhibition 
Hasher and Zacks's (1988) criticism of limited-resource 
views on age-related performance in cognitive tasks led them 
to propose a new perspective that can be extended to the 
domain of depressive performance. Their model emphasized 
disturbances in inhibitory processes associated with aging; 
"off goal-path thoughts" and their prolonged maintenance 
occupy attention. Similarly, Kuhl and Helle (1986) fouad 
evidence that depressed subjects prolong attention to goals 
that are not immediately relevant. Difficulties in inhibiting 
irrelevant thoughts are proposed by several accounts of 
depression, but most of them emphasize distractions associ­
ated with self-focus and mood state (see reviews by Ingram, 
1990, and Williams et al., 1988). Emphasizing a more general 
difficulty in inhibition is perhaps a more parsimonious ap­
proach to understanding depressive difficulties. The idea is 
not that depressed people are thinking pervasively about 
themselves and their feelings, any more than elderly people 
perseverate about themselves and the aging process; rather, 
disturbances in central inhibitory processes make any 
thoughts that come to mind distracting. 
Hasher and Zacks ( 1988) further suggested that aging peo­
ple compensate for these disturbances by relying on environ­
mental cues for performance. Our position on depressive 
difficulties is similar. The lack of initiative shown by depressed 
people perhaps results from competing thoughts that leave 
them "in a muddle." But they can compensate for their 
distractions by relying on environmental cues that focus their 
attention on the task at hand and allow them to demonstrate 
their competence. Ultimately, the resolution of issues related 
to performance versus competence in depressive memory 
might be less important than the discovery that depressed 
people perform well when the environment guides their atten­
tion. 
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